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What happens to job market signaling under two-dimensional asym-
metric information? With 2 types of productivity and noise, the equi-
librium remains separating if an extended single-crossing condition is
satis¯ed. If not, there are partially pooling equilibria where only ex-
treme types can be distinguished, and supplementary information is
needed. On-the-job interaction gives employers private information
on productivity, which employment relationships may reveal to the
market. While sticky wages lead to public revelation of this private
information through dismissals, °exible wages do not, allowing em-
ployers to do cream skimming. Beyond the 2x2 case, employment
relationships are always a noisy sign, so education is valuable as a
life-time job market signal for high-ability workers.
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11 Introduction
We analyze the informative role of signals in the Spence (1973) job mar-
ket model. In Spence (1973), education signals productivity because more
productive individuals have lower costs of education. However, subjective
signals may depend on factors other than quality di®erences.
We ask what happens to signals when individuals di®er not only in ability
but also in other personal traits. We speci¯cally posit that the costs of
signaling depend on the taste for study. However, the costs of signaling might
di®er for a host of other reasons that a®ect the utility cost of education, like
di®erences in time preferences, in the income of parents, or in the desire to
achieve social recognition. As long as these factors do not directly a®ect work
productivity, they are simply noise from the point of view of ¯rms.
Since the taste for study is part of personal preferences, this is private
information that has to be inferred from actions, just like ability. Once
this noise is taken into account, does education still act as a separating sig-
nal? With two types of ability and two types of taste for study, we show
a separating equilibrium still exists under two-dimensional asymmetric in-
formation if an extended single crossing condition is satis¯ed. However, no
separating equilibrium exists when it is violated. Rather, there are partially
pooling equilibria in which the probability the worker is more productive is
monotonically increasing in the signal. Though signaling is still somewhat
informative, only extreme types can be told apart.
This two-dimensional asymmetric information framework with four types
of agents, more or less productive workers with a taste for study or not, is
complementary to Riley (2001). Riley considers an extension of the original
Spence model where there are also four types of agents, because some less
productive workers have relatively low signaling costs in terms of education,
to analyze the consequences of introducing \noise". However, Riley's focus
is on equilibrium re¯nements. His main point is that the intuitive criterion
no longer selects a unique partially pooling equilibrium.1 He goes on to
analyze other equilibrium re¯nements to de¯ne out-of-equilibrium events,
and emphasizes that, as in screening models, the distribution of types is key
in determining the existence of a unique equilibrium.
1Since ine±cient equilibria can not be ruled out, there are multiple partially pooling
equilibria with either low education (less productive workers with high signaling costs in
terms of years of formal education), or high education (productive workers, or the two
types of less productive workers with low signaling costs).
2We do not try to tackle the problem of coordinating among the equilibria.
The point we try to make is di®erent: if there is asymmetric information on
other dimensions of workers' characteristics, making education a noisy signal
that does not lead to a separating equilibrium, employers need supplementary
information to sort out the productivity of workers. The signaling role of
education might be specially important on entry to the job market, but
later on employers could rely on the job-market record for more information.
Previous work experience is empirically important in job interviews (Behrenz
2001)
In relation to types of information, Spence (1973) distinguishes between
indices and signals. Indices are ¯xed attributes of job applicants, unalter-
able observable attributes such as race and sex. Since age does not change
at the discretion of the individual, Spence also considers it an index. Sig-
nals are observable characteristics that are subject to the manipulation by
the individual, of which education was singled out by Spence. As to other
sources of information, employers get to know a worker through day to day
contact at work. This generates private information that allows to assess a
worker's type better. This information is neither a ¯xed characteristic, nor is
it subject to the direct manipulation of the worker. From the point of view
of the worker, it is an involuntary \sign" generated along the work career
that indicates underlying characteristics. This private information will a®ect
employment relationships. If a worker is dismissed, this may in turn act as
an informational sign that reveals this information to the whole job market.2
Employment relationships are comparable to lending relationships in the
credit market. The creditworthiness of small ¯rms or individuals may only
be privately known to the bank or lender that has carried out transactions
with them and developed a relationship. This lending relationship generates
private information. However, the very existence of a relationship, if it is
observable, can act as a public sign to third parties of who is a good credit
or not. Getting a credit card or a loan can act as a good sign, and other
¯nancial intermediaries may try to get these clients.3 The same may happen
with people that have continued employment with a given ¯rm, though it is
2In terms of game theory, dismissals can be seen as signals insofar as they reveal the
employer's private information about the employee's type. The distinction we draw is that
employment relationships are not signals sent by the employee.
3In my personal experience, several credit card applications were turned down because
of lack of a previous credit record. However, after a special promotion by American Express
for university students, o®ers from commercial banks started piling up.
3not obvious how much information these employment relationships actually
reveal to outsiders.
In a sense, this approach links Spence's (1973) view on signals when
workers have private information about themselves, with Waldman's (1984)
approach where employers have private information about their employees.
To explore this implication and separate the earlier and later job career,
we embed the signaling game in a two-period framework. Gibbons and Katz
(1991) provide the insight that in a dynamic setting employment relationships
may be a sign to other ¯rms of the quality of workers in the job market. In a
setup where outside ¯rms only observe wage policies, we show that these signs
turn individual productivity into public information if wages are sticky, but
under °exible wages productivity remains private information and employers
enjoy an informational monopoly.
Section 2 ¯rst looks at the e®ects of two-dimensional asymmetric infor-
mation on the signaling role of education. Section 3 shows how employment
relationships may be, or not, a sign of underlying productivity according to
whether wages are sticky or °exible. Section 4 concludes.
2 Education as a signal
Akerlof (1970) pointed to devices such as guarantees as a potential way to
solve problems of asymmetric information. Since guarantees are less expen-
sive for sellers of high-quality goods than for sellers of low-quality goods, in
principle high-quality sellers will be more willing to provide a guarantee.
Spence (1973) showed the conditions under which a signal that is less
costly for high-quality sellers may indeed lead to separating equilibria where
they di®erentiate themselves from low-quality sellers, as well as the possibil-
ity of pooling equilibria where the two types cannot be distinguished. Our
signaling model builds on Spence (1973), where education is used as a signal
in the job market, abstracting completely from the contribution of education
to human capital.
Spence (1973) introduced heterogeneity in ability, so some individuals
have °atter indi®erence curves and are willing to go farther in terms of edu-
cation for any given wage increase. In our setup, preferences can di®er along
two dimensions, ability and other idiosyncratic factors that a®ect the psy-
chic costs of education, which for simplicity we refer to as the taste for study.
Once there is heterogeneity in another dimension, this introduces noise that
4can make the signal less informative. Whether this a®ects the original Spence
results will depend on what can be interpreted as the signal-to-noise ratio.
The players are workers and ¯rms. The timing is that workers ¯rst de-
cide the level of education, taking into account its informational role in the
job market. Competitive ¯rms then make their wage o®ers, based on the
expected productivity of workers according to their education.4
2.1 Preferences
Let a workers' utility depend positively on wages w and negatively on the
cost of education c,
(1) U(w;e;µ;º) = w ¡ c(e;µ;º).
In turn, the utility cost of education c depends on education e, where e ¸ 0,
worker's ability type µ, and idiosyncratic factors º such as the taste for
education.
In keeping with the original Spence model, the in°uence of the parameters





where high ability µ and high taste for education º both lower the costs
of education, and c0(e) > 0 (in the ¯gures below, we assume c(e) = e2 for
concreteness). These assumptions imply that the slope of the indi®erence
curves in space (e;w) are °atter for more able individuals (higher µ), and for














Firms are risk-neutral and maximize pro¯ts. Ability type µ determines
the productivity level. Pro¯ts equal a worker's productivity minus wages:
4The behavior of competitive ¯rms can be represented by a single player that mini-
mizes a loss function given by the quadratic di®erence between wages and productivity
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1991, chap. 11).
5(4) ¼ = µ ¡ w:
From a ¯rm's point of view, only factor µ matters, while factor º is
irrelevant for its pro¯ts. It will, however, introduce noise into the signal. In
a setting with perfectly competitive markets, expected pro¯ts will be zero,
so in expected value wages will equal productivity.
2.2 Worker heterogeneity
We assume that ability may be either low or high, µ 2 fµ1;µ2g, and taste
for education may also be low or high, º 2 fº1;º2g. Heterogeneity among
individuals implies that there are four types of agents, as shown in Table 1.
A key assumption in what follows is that ability and taste for education are
not perfectly correlated (if they were, the actual types of agents would be
reduced to two).
<please insert Table 1.Probability distribution in 2x2 case>
Let heterogeneity in taste be denoted by
(5) h ´ º2 ¡ º1:
Denote by e h the knife-edge case of heterogeneity that separate the in-
tervals of what will be characterized below as high and low signal-to-noise
ratios:
(6) µ1(º1 +e h) = µ2º1:
The case h 2 [0;e h] will correspond to a high signal-to-noise ratio where
tastes vary relatively less than productivity.5 The case h 2 (e h;H], for some
positive H > e h, will correspond to a low signal-to-noise ratio in which tastes
vary relatively more than productivity.
5In the knife-edge case h = e h, the indi®erence curves of types (µ1;º2) and (µ2;º1) are
exactly superimposed on each other.
62.3 Single-crossing
If no signal were available, all workers would have a common level of zero
education. In that case, ¯rms would o®er workers a wage equal to expected
productivity, i.e. w = E(µ), where E(µ) = (p11 + p12)µ1 + (p21 + p22)µ2. We
now analyze what happens when a signal is available to di®erentiate workers.
In terms of the present notation, the original Spence model corresponds
to h = 0. This case boils down to two types of workers, high and low produc-
tivity. Spence (1973) showed there are a continuum of separating equilibria.
These equilibria can be characterized as perfect Bayesian equilibria. By the
Cho and Kreps (1987) intuitive criterion, however, only the least cost sepa-
rating signal, where the low productivity worker is just indi®erent between
studying or not, remains; this equilibrium coincides with the Riley outcome
(Riley 1979).
There are also pooling equilibria in Spence(1973). These perfect Bayesian
equilibria can be discarded applying the Cho-Kreps (1987) equilibrium dom-
inance arguments: a competent worker has lower signaling costs, so it will be
willing to deviate to levels of education higher than what any incompetent
worker would ever pick.
We now show that the result that the Riley outcome is the unique per-
fect Bayesian equilibrium that satis¯es the Cho-Kreps re¯nement generalizes
to the interval h 2 (0;e h], which can be interpreted as an interval with a









With one-dimensional asymmetric information, the Spence-Mirrlees single-
crossing condition asserts that the slope of indi®erence curves is decreasing in
µ. This di®erential condition can be related to single crossing as an ordering
of types in terms of µ (cf. Edlin and Shannon 1998). With two-dimensional
asymmetric information, the marginal costs of signaling are given by the
slope of the indi®erence curves in (3), which in our speci¯cation are inversely
related to the product » = µº. An extension of the Spence-Mirrlees condition
to a two-dimensional setup is as follows:
De¯nition 1 Single-crossing in µ is satis¯ed under two dimensional hetero-
geneity if the slope of indi®erence curves in space (e;w) is (i) decreasing in
7µ, and (ii) the decrease in µ is always greater than with any change in º.
Di®erentiation of (3) shows condition (i) is satis¯ed. As to condition
(ii), given our multiplicative assumption about the utility function, the two
dimensions can be projected over a one-dimensional interval. In the 2x2 case,
condition (ii) in terms of the ordering of types can be expressed as:
(8) µ1º1 < µ1º2 · µ2º1 < µ2º2:
The relative variation in the second dimension is crucial in determining
the ranking of the marginal costs of signaling. When (7) holds, more pro-
ductive workers indeed have °atter indi®erence curves than less productive
workers, so (8) is satis¯ed.6
If the extended single-crossing property is satis¯ed, beliefs ¹(:) on worker
productivity in a separating equilibrium will be given by
(9) f
e = 0 ) ¹(µ = µ1je = 0) = 1
e = es ) ¹(µ = µ2je = es) = 1 :
For out-of-equilibrium values of education e, we assume a ¯rm will expect
productivity µ1 if e < es, and productivity µ2 if e > es. These beliefs de-
termine the conditional probability a worker is productive for each observed
level of education.
(10) f
0 < e < es ) ¹(µ = µ1je) = 1
e > es ) ¹(µ = µ2je) = 1 :
One can de¯ne es by picking as signal the least-cost level of education
that will di®erentiate more and less productive workers, as Figure 1 shows.
<please insert Figure 1. Single crossing: Separating equilibrium>
The least cost separating signal is determined by the less productive
worker with a high taste for study, at point A in Figure 1. At this point,
worker type (µ1;º2) is indi®erent between getting a high wage w = µ2 with
6The Appendix discusses condition (ii) for the NxN case of a ¯nite number of types.
With a continuum of types µ and º, condition (ii) is impossible to ful¯ll unless the range
of variation of º is null.
8education e = es, and a low wage w = µ1 with education e = 0. It is con-
sistent with a Nash equilibrium to assume a worker will not signal when it
is just indi®erent (to break indi®erence, it would su±ce to consider a signal
es +², with ² > 0 that is arbitrarily small). More productive workers strictly
prefer to signal and get a high wage, rather than not signal and get a low
wage.
Given our speci¯cation for out-of-equilibrium beliefs, neither type of worker
has an incentive to choose any other level of education because it would
strictly reduce its utility. Hence, behavior will conform to (9), so this is
indeed a separating equilibrium. The ine±cient separating equilibria with
levels of education es > e can be discarded by application of the Cho-Kreps
intuitive criterion.7
A pooling equilibrium w = E(µ), where all workers are paid the average
productivity of the pool of workers, can be discarded as shown in Figure 2.
This pooling equilibrium implies that, whatever the level of education, ¯rms
will infer that expected productivity is E(µ). However, the farthest that
a low productivity worker is willing to deviate is point B, with education
ed. High productivity workers have lower signaling costs, so they can be
better o® to the right of that point. Since those deviations are dominated in
equilibrium for less productive types but not for more productive types, by
the intuitive criterion ¯rms can infer that a worker has high productivity if
levels of education larger than (or equal to) ed are observed. That restriction
on out-of-equilibrium beliefs destroys any pooling equilibrium.
<Please insert Figure 2. Single crossing: No pooling equilibrium>
Likewise, one can discard partially pooling equilibria where some of the
types are bunched together, namely: the three types with highest » choose
the same high signal, or the two intermediate types of » choose the same
intermediate signal, or the three types with the lowest » pick the same low
signal. The reason is that the indi®erence curves of more productive workers
are °atter than the indi®erence curves of less productive types, so more
productive workers will always be willing to deviate farther to the right than
less productive workers to signal their type.
7There are a multiplicity of separating equilibria with more education than es. How-
ever, these Perfect Bayesian Equilibria do not satisfy the intuitive criterion: the out-of
equilibrium beliefs would imply that low productivity workers can signal with positive
probability in the interval to the right of es to get a high wage, when in fact that is dom-
inated in equilibrium by not signaling and getting a low wage. Only high productivity
workers will be willing to pick signals in that interval to get a high wage.
9These results can be summarized as follows.
Proposition 2 If single-crossing under two-dimensional heterogeneity holds,
there is a unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium that satis¯es the intuitive cri-
terion. This is a separating equilibrium where less productive workers pick
zero education and more productive workers pick a positive level of education
that is just enough to signal their type.
Hence, with a high signal-to-noise ratio the signaling results of the basic
Spence model are robust to two-dimensional asymmetric information. In this
interval, only the Riley outcome {the undominated separating equilibrium{
survives re¯nements of the perfect Bayesian equilibrium that apply the intu-
itive criterion.
2.4 No single-crossing
In the interval h 2 (e h;H], condition (7) is no longer satis¯ed and the ranking
of the two intermediate types is inverted:
(11) µ1º1 < µ2º1 < µ1º2 < µ2º2:
More productive workers no longer have lower costs of signaling. Once the
extended single-crossing condition does not hold, no separating equilibrium
exists. Why not is easy to see from Figure 3: a worker of type (µ2;º1) is not
willing to go farther than point C in Figure 3, while a worker of type (µ1;º2)
is. That is, when the ranking is inverted, a less productive worker with high
taste for study is willing to invest in more education than a productive worker
with low taste for study.
<please insert Figure 3. No single crossing: No separating equilibrium>
A pooling equilibrium can be discarded as before by application of the
intuitive criterion: a productive worker of type (µ2;º2) will always be willing
to deviate. A partially pooling equilibrium where type (µ1;º1) worker picks
zero education and the other three types with highest » pick a common
positive level of education can be ruled out by a similar argument. However,
two other logical possibilities for partially pooling equilibria cannot be ruled
out. First, intermediate types pick an intermediate level of education, while
other types pick either zero or high education. Second, all types except
(µ2;º2) pick zero education.
10First, consider a partially pooling equilibrium with three signals. Type
(µ1;º1) picks zero education, e = 0. Intermediate worker types (µ1;º2) and
(µ2;º1) send the same intermediate signal ei. Finally, type (µ2;º2) picks the
highest level of education es. Beliefs ¹(:) are given by:
(12) f
e = 0 ) ¹(µ = µ1je = 0) = 1
e = ei ) ¹(µ = µ1je = ei) =
p12
p12+p21
e = es ) ¹(µ = µ2je = es) = 1
:
For out-of-equilibrium levels of education, we assume expected produc-
tivity equals that of the lowest level of education within each interval. Out-
of-equilibrium beliefs are:
(13) f
0 < e < ei ) ¹(µ = µ1je) = 1
ei < e < es ) ¹(µ = µ1je) =
p12
p12+p21
e > es ) ¹(µ = µ2je) = 1
:
Expected productivity if an individual has intermediate education is E[µje =
ei] =
p12µ1+p21µ2
p12+p21 . The equilibrium with the least-cost signals ei and es is rep-
resented graphically in Figure 4, where µi ´
p12µ1+p21µ2
p12+p21 .
<please insert Figure 4. No single crossing: Partially pooling equilibrium>
In the spirit of the Riley outcome, let the least-cost intermediate signal
be determined at point D, with education e = ei and average wage wi = µi,
on the indi®erence curve of type (µ1;º1) that goes through point e = 0 and
w = µ1. And let the least-cost high signal be determined at point E, where
type (µ1;º2) is just indi®erent between point D and education e = es with
wage w = µ2. It is easy to show that no type will want to deviate. Given
these levels of expected productivity, ¯rms will be willing to actually pay
these wages. However, this partially pooling equilibrium is not unique.8
8Cho and Kreps (1987) remark for the Spence signaling model with three types of
productivity that the intuitive criterion is not always strong enough to ensure the Riley
outcome. Similarly, here an intermediate signal in the range between point D in Figure
4 and the point where the indi®erence curve of type (µ2;º1) through coordinates (0;µ1)
cuts the intermediate wage line (call it D0) may also satisfy (12), with the high signal
now determined where the indi®erence curve of type (µ1;º2) through point D0 cuts the
high wage line (call this point E0). The only equilibria that can be ruled out over the
interval [D;D0] are those where the highest possible wage for type (µ1;º1), w = µ2, is at
11Second, for some parameter values there might be another partially pool-
ing equilibrium where the three types with lowest » pick zero education, and
type (µ2;º2) picks a positive level of education es.9 Let equilibrium beliefs
be:
(14) f
e = 0 ) ¹(µ = µ1je = 0) =
p11+p12
p11+p12+p21
e = es ) ¹(µ = µ2je = es)
:
For out-of-equilibrium levels of education, we assume expected produc-
tivity equals that at the lowest level of education within each interval. Out-
of-equilibrium beliefs are:
(15) f
0 < e < es ) ¹(µ = µ1je) =
p11+p12
p11+p12+p21
e > es ) ¹(µ = µ2je) = 1
:
Expected productivity if an individual has no education is E[µje = 0] =
(p11+p12)µ1+p21µ2
p11+p12+p21 . The partially pooling equilibrium with the least-cost signal
es can be constructed by an argument similar to Figure 4. This is a perfect
Bayesian equilibrium because no type of worker is willing to deviate. Addi-
tionally, there are other equilibria that are less e±cient, so it is not unique
equilibrium.10
The intuitive criterion is not always capable of ruling out partially pooling
equilibrium (14). Let µlow ´
(p11+p12)µ1+p21µ2
p11+p12+p21 , and µi ´
p12µ1+p21µ2
p12+p21 . It is
possible to rule out this equilibrium if the education-wage pair (ed, µ2) that
leaves type (µ1;º1) indi®erent to education-wage pair (0, µlow) is such that
type (µ2;º1) prefers (ed,µi) to alternative (0, µlow). Figure 5 illustrates the
case when it is possible to rule out this equilibrium. This will depend on
an education level that leads to a point below the indi®erence curve that gives this type
its equilibrium payo®. In that case, equilibrium dominance arguments can be used to rule
out this type. However, since indi®erence curves of type (µ1;º1) do not become vertical
at D, there always remains a non-empty interval to the right of D over which equilibrium
dominance arguments have no bite.
9I thank Gustavo Maradona for pointing this out.
10Namely, it is possible to have equilibria where the three types with lowest » pick some
positive level of education, together with out-of-equilibrium beliefs that assign individu-
als with no education low productivity. These socially less e±cient equilibria cannot be
discarded by the intuitive criterion.
12speci¯c parameter values, requiring su±ciently large µ2 or su±ciently small
p12
p12+p21.
<please insert Figure 5. No single crossing: Alternative partially pooling
equilibrium?>
Consequently, we have established the following result:
Proposition 3 If single-crossing under two-dimensional heterogeneity does
not hold, multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria satisfy the intuitive criterion.
There is a partially pooling equilibrium where types with low µ and º pick zero
education, intermediate types pick intermediate education, and types with high
µ and º pick high education; besides an undominated equilibrium, partially
pooling equilibria with excess education are possible. For some parameter
values there are partially pooling equilibria where types with high µ and º
pick high education, while the rest pick low education.
Proposition 2 implies that extreme signals are still e®ective in conveying a
workers' type. It is in the middle ground (which may include all but the most
able and motivated employees) that there is noise and imperfect revelation
of type. From the viewpoint of ¯rms in our model, the parameter º basically
introduces noise into the signal. The setup without single-crossing can be
interpreted as a case of a low signal-to-noise ratio.
As to the relevance of a partially pooling equilibrium, the Appendix an-
alyzes the extended single-crossing condition in the NxN case: for a given
range of variation of productivity, as the number N ¡2 of intermediate pro-
ductivity types grows, it becomes impossible to satisfy single-crossing unless
the range of variation in the second dimension shrinks faster (and disappears
in the limit). How serious the issue of noise is will depend on the relative
range of variation of each dimension: perhaps only close productivity types
are bunched together, or instead very distant productivity types are.
3 Employment relationships as signs
If education is indeed a noisy signal, signaling via education will lead to a
partially pooling equilibrium. This information could be specially relevant
to determine entry requirements (again, we are abstracting from the role of
education in the buildup of human capital, that enhances productivity in
itself). Afterwards, one would expect ¯rms to use other types of information
13to sort productive and unproductive workers. In this regard, we explore the
role of employment relationships.
The process of revelation of productivity at work takes time, so to in-
corporate this feature requires a minimum of dynamics. To incorporate the
information generated in an employment relationship, we assume there are
two periods. The ¯rst period represents the early work career, while the
second period represents the later work career. A workers' utility depends
on wages wt in periods t = 1;2, as well as on the cost of education c. The
parameter ± · 1 represents the discount factor, while l ¸ 1 represents the
length of the later work career in relation to the early work career (in case






In the ¯rst period, the worker has private information on its productivity
and signals with a given education level. Firms then make job o®ers condi-
tional on educational levels. After the ¯rst period has elapsed, the employer
observes the worker's true productivity. Employment relationships may turn
this private information into public information in the second period.
We analyze how the revelation of information is related to wage-setting.
We consider two polar cases, sticky and °exible wages. As to their relevance,
Gottschalk (2005) explains a lot of the evidence on nominal wage °exibility in
terms of measurement error. Bewley (2002) reports that wage cuts, de¯ned as
the reduction in the pay of an employee continuing to work under unchanged
conditions, is low according to surveys of employers from several countries,
and is negligible in the few existing studies of company records.
The arrangements on sticky wages may depend on fairness considerations,
as in the Akerlof and Yellen (1988) fair wage/e®ort hypothesis. Indeed, Bew-
ley (2002) reports that surveys of business managers responsible for compen-
sation policy show that employers avoid cutting pay because doing so would
hurt morale and goodwill, and hence productivity. It may well be that dif-
ferent corporations follow di®erent norms of fairness, so not all need apply
the same policy. Nevertheless, if most notions of fairness consider wage cuts
unfair and lead to a reduction of work e®ort, this could lead to a prevalence
of sticky wages in most ¯rms.
Even if nominal wages are mostly sticky, an in°ationary environment
helps to °exibilize real wages, which are the relevant variable for the dis-
14missal decision. In this regard, Gibbons and Waldman (1999) mention sev-
eral studies that show real wage decreases are not rare, though demotions
are.
Rather than analyze wage decisions, we will focus on the choice of the
employer among wage policies (the employer also follows an employment
policy that determines employment relationships). That is, an employer will
set a rule, conditional on a worker's productivity, that will determine whether
the wage is changed or not in the second period. Though a given wage policy
can be seen as an ex-ante commitment that de¯nes what an employer will
do when productivity is revealed, the ¯rm is free to pick its best wage policy
(not all rules may be equally credible). The informational requirements for
other ¯rms of observing the employer's wage policy are smaller than observing
wage decisions, because they do not need to know the speci¯c wages that each
employee is receiving. Furthermore, if other ¯rms observed each individual
wage o®ers, this would provide additional information on employees that goes
beyond information contained in employment relationship.
3.1 Sticky wages
Suppose that wages are sticky, so ¯rms cannot reduce the wages of their
employees. In the context of this restriction, a ¯rm that maximizes pro¯ts
might want to dismiss (lay o® or ¯re) in the second period workers whose
¯rst-period contract stipulates a wage larger than their productivity. To not
enter into the issue of the duration of unemployment spells, we will simply
assume that either there is a sign of continued employment relationship or
not.
In the second period, the timing is that the informed ¯rm (the employer)
decides its employment policy, setting a cuto® productivity level below which
workers are dismissed. For those workers who qualify for a renewal of their
contract, the employer determines a wage policy conditional on worker type
(the employer can o®er a wage hike). The outside ¯rm (that represents the
competive market) observes the employment policy and the wage policy, and
takes this information into account when de¯ning its wage policy. Finally,
the employer observes true productivity, which will determine whether the
worker is dismissed or not, and workers who are not dismissed have to decide
between staying on the job or switching ¯rms.
We can solve the game by backwards induction. Workers will accept the
highest job o®er they get (one can assume that if workers are indi®erent, they
15do not switch jobs). It is immediate to see what happens if the ¯rst-period
equilibrium is separating: ¯rst-period wages equal productivity of workers,
so outside ¯rms will be willing to pay that same wage. Employers will match
that, and o®er to renew the contracts of all workers.
On the other hand, if the ¯rst-period equilibrium is partially pooling as
in (12), there is a signal of intermediate education that corresponds to a mix
of productive and unproductive workers.11 Figure 6 depicts this case. We
condider three employment policies: dismiss all these workers (d;d), dismiss
less productive workers µ1 whose productivity is below their ¯rst-period wage
(d;n), or not dismiss any workers (n;n).
<please insert Figure 6. Employment and wage policies of informed and
uninformed ¯rms>
The policy of dismissing less productive workers (d;n) will indicate that
dismissed workers have low productivity, and the rest have high productivity
because there are only two types of productivity (we show below that em-
ployer will not prefer alternative employment policies). The outside ¯rm can
condition its wage o®er on whether the worker is dismissed or not: it will
be willing to pay dismissed workers a low wage µ1, and continuing workers
a high wage µ2. Consequently, the employer has to o®er its more produc-
tive workers a second-period wage equal to their productivity. This means
that the employer will make zero pro¯ts on its continuing employees. Thus,
regardless of whether the ¯rst period equilibrium is separating or partially
pooling, in the second period there is an equilibrium where high productivity
workers get a high wage and low productivity workers a low wage equal to
their productivity.
Proposition 4 With 2 productivity types, if wages are sticky there is an
equilibrium where employment relationships reveal an employer's private in-
formation on productivity, so wages equal productivity in the second period.
We can now analyze the ¯rst-period equilibrium. The solution is straight-
forward if the second-period equilibrium reveals the employer's private infor-
mation. The key observation is that, if in the second period wages depend
on underlying ability that is fully revealed to the market, wages are indepen-
dent of education. That is, education only a®ects wages in the ¯rst period.
The ¯rst period equilibrium can thus be analyzed as in Section 2, where the
11For some parameter values, partially pooling equilibrium (14) with two signals is also
possible. The analysis would be similar to that in text.
16interpretation is now that the costs of education have to be compared to the
bene¯ts in the early job career (period one).
As to alternative employment polices, foreseeing that dismissals reveal
productivity, employers could decide not to dismiss anybody. Indeed, as an
alternative, the employer can keep all workers, paying them µi (if it payed
more, in expected value it would lose money). The outside ¯rm will be
willing to match that, since it will make zero pro¯ts. The employer can also
dismiss all workers, in which case the outside ¯rm will be willing to pay them
their expected productivity µi. Since any of the three employment policies in
Figure 6 leads to zero expected pro¯ts, the employer is in principle indi®erent
among them. However, the equilibria where employment relationships do not
reveal an employers private information on productivity are not credible ex-
post.12 Furthermore, beyond 2 productivity types, the employment policy
of discriminating between low and high productivity workers will provide
positive rents, so it will be strictly preferred by the employer to the other
policies where expected pro¯ts are always zero.13
3.2 Flexible wages
What happens if ¯rms can reduce the wages of employees who are found to
have low productivity? In that case, the outside ¯rm will not be able to
distinguish high and low productivity workers by their employment relation-
ships, because there is no need of dismissing unproductive workers.
The second period timing is that the employer ¯rst decides its wage pol-
icy. The employer can condition its wage o®er on the productivity type each
employee has. The second-period o®er may be either larger or smaller than
the ¯rst period wage since there are no restrictions on wage cuts. The unin-
12Ex-post, the employer may want to switch policies: if revealed productivity of its
employees with intermediate education were below the ¯rst period wage, it would not
want to keep them all; if revealed productivity were above the ¯rst period wage, it would
not want to dismiss them all.
13If we analyzed employment and wage policies instead, the result would be pretty
similar. There is an equilibrium where the employer dismisses less productive employees,
and keeps more productive employees with a wage of µ2, when outside ¯rms o®er to pay
continuing workers µ2 whatever the wage o®er of the employer. Dismissing all workers is an
equilibrium if outside ¯rms o®er µ2 to all continuing workers. Not dismissing any workers,
o®ering them all µi, is only an equilibrium if all workers switch to outside ¯rms when wage
o®ers match (an assumption opposite to that made in text). In all three equilibria, the
employer makes zero pro¯ts ex-post.
17formed ¯rm does not observe the exact o®er the informed ¯rm makes to each
employee, but it observes the wage policy, in terms of what wages are o®ered
to each type of worker. On the basis of the employer's wage policy, outside
¯rms make the employees an unconditional countero®er, which they cannot
condition on the worker's type because this is inside information. Finally,
each type of worker has to decide between staying on the job or switching
¯rms.
We can solve the game by backwards induction. Workers will accept the
highest job o®er they get. Again, it is immediate to see what happens if the
¯rst-period equilibrium is separating. Outside ¯rms will be willing to pay the
¯rst-period wages, which equal productivity. The employer will match that,
o®ering a renewal of contracts. We assume that workers who are indi®erent
do not switch jobs.
On the other hand, if the ¯rst-period equilibrium is partially pooling,
there is a signal of intermediate education that corresponds to a mix of more
and less productive workers. Less productive workers will face a wage cut,
since the employer will not be willing to pay more than µ1. However, the
employer has more options for more productive workers µ2: schematically,
it can o®er to raise the wage, to reduce it, or to maintain it at level of
¯rst-period wage µi =
p12µ1+p21µ2
p12+p21 . This is represented in Figure 7.14
<please insert Figure 7. Wage policies of informed and uninformed ¯rms>
For simplicity, the representation is restricted to conditional strategies
where the informed ¯rm always o®ers low productivity workers a low wage.
On the other hand, it can o®er high productivity workers either the same
wage µi as in the ¯rst period, a low wage µ1 (the same logic will apply to any
other low wage), or a high wage µ2 (the same logic will apply to any other
high wage). As to the unconditional strategies of uninformed ¯rms, they can
o®er wages between µ1 and µi (any wage higher than µi would lead them to
lose money). For simplicity, we only represent the two endpoints.
In view of these logical possibilities, if the employer o®ers type µ2 employ-
ees a raise above µi, uninformed ¯rms will have an incentive to o®er a low
wage equal to µ1, because at any wage equal to or lower than the expected
productivity of the pool of workers with intermediate education they will
only attract lemons, losing money. If the employer o®ers type µ2 employees a
wage reduction below µi, uninformed ¯rms can o®er all workers a wage that
is slightly higher (up to µi), attracting the whole pool and still making a
14The analysis for the partially pooling equilibrium with two signals is similar.
18pro¯t. The last possibility is to o®er type µ2 employees the same wage µi as
in period one. If we assume for simplicity that a worker does not switch jobs
when indi®erent (to not have to add " to break tie), then uninformed ¯rms
have an incentive to o®er a low wage equal to µ1: at a wage equal to average
productivity µi of pool they would only attract lemons, loosing money.
Given this maximizing behavior of uninformed ¯rms, namely, o®ering µi
to pool of workers if the employer o®ers more productive workers less than
µi, and o®ering µ1 if employer o®ers them µi or more, the informed ¯rm has
an incentive to pick the conditional strategy of o®ering type µ1 workers a
wage equal to their productivity µ1, and type µ2 workers the same wage µi as
in the ¯rst period. Consequently,
Proposition 5 With 2 productivity types, if wages are °exible employment
relationships do not reveal an employer's private information on productivity.
If the ¯rst period signaling game is separating, wages equal productivity in
the second period. If the ¯rst period signaling game is partially pooling, the
employer will have an informational rent on some high productivity workers,
while other wages will equal productivity in the second period.
The main insight from °exible wages is that, if employers can use condi-
tional wage strategies, information on productivity may remain private even
when there are only two types of productivity. The employer will have an
informational monopoly: the informed ¯rms will be under no pressure to
raise the wage of productive workers with intermediate education. Hence,
the informed ¯rm can engage in cream-skimming, paying more productive
workers with less education below their full productivity. Given this second
period outcome, wages for productive workers in the second period will not
be independent of education.15
15Our analysis di®ers from Gibbons and Katz (1991), because we consider wage poli-
cies instead of wage o®ers, and two productivity types instead of a continuum of types.
For wage o®ers with two productivity types, one can ¯nd the following equilibrium: the
employer o®ers a wage µ1 to µ1 type workers, and plays a mixed strategy of o®ering µ2
type workers either a wage of µ1 or a wage larger than µ1 (which can be as large as µ2).
The uninformed ¯rm o®ers a wage equal to expected productivity of pool of workers that
receive a wage o®er of µ1, and a wage µ2 to workers that receive any wage o®er larger
than µ1. Given these strategies, both the employer and the uninformed ¯rms are making
zero pro¯ts, and neither has an incentive to deviate. Hence, with 2 productivity types, if
uninformed ¯rms observe individual wages there will be no rents, instead of positive rents
when they only observe wage policy. This makes sense because individual wages convey
19This result implies that the ¯rst and second period games cannot be
analyzed separately when productivity remains private information. If a
productive worker invests in more education in the ¯rst period, it can earn
higher wages not only in the ¯rst period, but also in the second period.
On the other hand, for unproductive workers education only leads to higher
wages in the ¯rst period. I.e., for more productive workers w2 = w1, while
for less productive workers w2 = µ1. Hence, the objective functions in the
¯rst period can be simpli¯ed as follows:
(17) f
µ = µ2 : U(w1;w2 = w1;e;µ2;º) = w1(1 + l±) ¡ c(e;µ2;º)
µ = µ1 : U(w1;w2 = µ1;e;µ1;º) = w1 + l±µ1 ¡ c(e;µ1;º) :
This implies that the indi®erence curves of more productive workers be-
come °atter in the ¯rst period:
(18) f













The high signal-to-noise case of Section 2 becomes more likely because
more productive workers are willing to go farther to invest in education:
the educational signal a®ects their earnings over their whole work career, in
contrast to less productive workers who only bene¯t in their early work career.
Though signaling becomes more revealing, a partially pooling equilibrium is
not ruled out if (1 + ±l)µ2=µ1 < º2=º1.
The ¯rst-period analysis has to be amended for a feature similar to Wald-
man (1984): given our assumption of perfect competition, all workers with
intermediate education will be paid a bond in the ¯rst period equal to the
discounted value of the informational rent that employers enjoy. This bond
is shared by more productive workers with intermediate education and less
productive workers with the same education. The bond bi, discounted at








more information about individual worker than wage policies do. However, the feature
that µ2 type workers receive a wage below their productivity remains.
20This bond bi has to be reckoned with in the computation of the ¯rst
period equilibrium: type (µ2;º1) has to forego this bond if it switches from
intermediate signal ei to high signal es, while type (µ1;º2) gets this bond if
it switches from low signal e = 0 to intermediate signal ei. Hence, in some
borderline cases there may be a partially pooling equilibrium, instead of a
separating equilibrium, because of this bond.
3.3 Empirical implications
Under sticky wages, Table 2 shows there is a positive correlation between
education and wages: more highly educated workers on average get higher
wages in the second period. Hence, even if education is a noisy signal, the
standard implication of Spence (1973) stands over time. Second, there is
a positive correlation between employment relationships (workers who have
not been dismissed) and wages. That is, dismissed workers earn less, and
this e®ect is important for people with more education. This is precisely
the empirical pattern of layo®s and lemons so nicely studied by Gibbons and
Katz (1991).
<please insert Table 2. Second period wages with public information>
Under °exible wages, Table 3 shows that there is also a positive correlation
between education and wages: more highly educated workers on average get
higher wages in the second period (w1;i stands for the wage that individuals
with intermediate education receive in periods 1 and 2). However, workers
with the same productivity and di®erent education may earn di®erent wages,
due to the informational rents that employers enjoy.
<please insert Table 3. Second period wages with private information>
If the ¯rst period were only a short probationary period where the em-
ployer could gather all the relevant information on productivity, education
would not be very relevant as a job-market signal. For the present frame-
work to add empirically relevant insights, the early work career has to be
relatively extensive in relation to the later work career. In this regard, a
partially pooling equilibrium with three signals in the ¯rst period implies
a growth over time of the variance of wages for higher educational levels,
because in the second period some workers with intermediate education get
high wages and others get low wages.16 This can be related to Mincer (1974),
16This would not happen in the partially pooling equilibrium with two signals. However,
since for some parameter values this equilibrium does not exist, in the text we concentrate
21who has a table based on 1960 U.S. Census (reproduced in Weiss 1983) that
shows that while the variance of the log of weekly earnings hardly changes
for people with 5-8 years of schooling, for people with 12 years of schooling
it rises smoothly but steadily, from .205 at ages 24-29 to .317 at ages 55-59.
And for people with 16 years of schooling, where signaling can be expected
to be especially important because of the more autonomous nature of jobs,
the variance rises a lot: from .235 for 24-29 year-old group and .277 for 35-39
year-old group, to .424 for 45-49 year-old group, and .552 for 55-59 year-old
group. Albeit indirectly, the fact that the variance in earnings for people
with 16 years of schooling at ¯rst does not rise much might indicate that the
early work career could represent a period of up to 10 or 15 years.
Ashenfelter and Krueger (1994) ¯nd that returns to education for identi-
cal twins may be as large as for the population as a whole, which in the line of
human capital models can be interpreted as isolating the e®ect of education
on earnings, controlling for ability. Weiss (1995) also o®ers a sorting expla-
nation: ¯rms will infer a worker's unobserved ability from the educational
choice, so education should a®ect initial wages according to the signaling
model. Weiss goes on to say that if the signaling model is correct, the return
to schooling across twins should decline over time, and he ¯nds some evidence
in that direction. However, the results above show that the implication of the
signaling models critically depend on whether the employer's private infor-
mation becomes public or not: if it becomes public, wage di®erences should
decline over time, but if it doesn't, wage di®erences will not decline.17 The
implication of private information is that wages need not match productivity,
because the employer's private information leads to informational rents. In
this context, education as a signal will not only a®ect the wages of more able
workers in their early job career, but rather over their whole career.
In the 2x2 case, productivity becomes public information with sticky
wages regardless of education in the ¯rst period, while with °exible wages
productivity remains private information for intermediate types. If sticky
wages are prevalent, an implication is that there should be less dismissals
under an in°ationary environment than under stable prices, because in°ation
on the partially pooling equilibirum with three signals.
17In fact, the model with °exible wages implies that di®erence will increase, because
workers with intermediate education are paid an extra bond in the ¯rst period equal to
expected discounted value of the informational rent in the second period. Wages that
decline over the life-cycle are counter-factual, but we are abstracting from the positive
in°uence of experience and human capital on earnings.
22is a real-wage reducing device. This may also be a speci¯c example in which
in°ation can contribute to make prices (here, wages) less informative.
When there are more than two productivity types, the Appendix shows
that the result on full revelation of employer's private information through
employment relationships under sticky wages does not hold. This is not
surprising: in a di®erent setup, Gibbons and Katz (1991) show that with a
continuum of productivity types, dismissals only reveal that workers with a
continuing employment relationship have productivity above a certain cut-
o® level. What is true is that more information is always revealed under
sticky wages than under °exible wages. The key intuition is that uninformed
¯rms are always willing to pay the pool of continuing workers their expected
productivity, which exceeds ¯rst-period wage under sticky wages, but equals
¯rst-period wage with °exible wages. The higher wage o®ers that uninformed
¯rms are willing to make under sticky wages limit the informational rents of
the informed ¯rm.
The fact that on-the-job productivity does not fully become public in-
formation might help explain the role of an MBA, where people with work
experience enroll. In comparison to other graduate programs, an MBA has
less of a human capital role, and more of a signaling role. Indeed, some par-
ticipants in the process describe it as basically going around from one meeting
to another with corporate representatives. Such a limited role can make per-
fect sense to those students that basically need the MBA as a system-wide
signal to reveal their ability, if their work record does not accomplish that
for them. By (18), even if ability did not reduce the costs of education, high
productivity agents would still have lower signaling costs because education
increases their life-time earnings. This leads to self-selection: only people
who believe they are high-ability have a large incentive to invest in an MBA
as a job-market signal.
4 Conclusions
This paper analyzes the implications of two-dimensional asymmetric infor-
mation for Spence's (1973) signaling model. Both ability and an idiosyncratic
factor, called taste for study, can be either high or low. An extended single-
crossing condition is satis¯ed when the ranking of signaling costs is basically
determined by ability. When there is single-crossing, the equilibrium is sep-
arating. When not, the equilibrium becomes partially pooling.
23The second dimension basically allows to analyze the in°uence of noise
on the informative content of the signal. If education is indeed a noisy
signal, it will be an imperfect proxy for a worker's productivity so other
information will be used by ¯rms. In this regard, the work record is singled
out in this paper. Interaction at the work place generates private information
on productivity for the employer. This is modeled in a dynamic setting
where the ¯rst period, which represents the early job career, is the signaling
game. The second period represents the later job career, where employers
use information from the ¯rst period to judge productivity.
One way information on work productivity observed by the employer may
become public is through the Gibbons and Katz (1991) idea on layo®s reveal-
ing lemons. Outside ¯rms observe employment relationships. Continuity of
working relationships can act as a sign of high productivity to other ¯rms if
higher productivity workers are more likely to keep their job. We ¯nd that if
wages are °exible, employment relationships reveal no private information at
all. Employers do not need to dismiss lemons, they can simply reduce their
wages.18 With sticky wages, on the other hand, employment relationships
can be a sign to the market of which employees have high productivity, and
dismissals indicate who are lemons.19
When the analysis is extended to consider more types of ability and taste
for study, it becomes harder to satisfy the extended single-crossing condi-
tion that ensures education is a separating signal. Unlike the continuous
case with asymmetric information in one dimension (Spence 2002), one can
expect that with asymmetric information and heterogeneity in two dimen-
sions, the equilibrium with a continuum of types will never be separating, but
rather partially pooling. However, signaling is quite resilient to the introduc-
tion of asymmetric information in two dimensions, in the sense that average
productivity is still increasing in the degree of education, and extreme types
still send unequivocal signals. However, intermediate types will be di±cult
to tell apart.
As to the informative role of employment relationships, when one goes
18We analyze in text the case where outside ¯rms observe the employers' wage policies.
The result is similar when outside ¯rms observe individual wages, but there wage o®ers
convey in themselves additional information about the individual worker's productivity.
19The model completely ignores that work productivity is in part a matter of matching
the right person to the right job (Jovanovic 1979). This increases the amount of asymmetric
information, since a worker does not know its productivity type before hand. Dismissals
will indicate a mismatch, but not necessarily that dismissed workers are lemons.
24beyond the 2x2 case revelation of information is always incomplete even if
wages are sticky. Hence, employers will have an informational rent, paying
some more productive workers less than their full productivity (under perfect
competition, ¯rms will in turn pay out a bond, which more able workers
will have to share with the less able). Given incomplete revelation of private
information, education becomes important for high ability workers as a signal
not only in their early job career, but over their whole work cycle.
If education is a life-time signal only for individuals with high ability,
studying can make perfect sense to them despite the fact they face a larger
opportunity cost of not working. The higher opportunity cost is more than
compensated by the larger earnings over the complete career, making signal-
ing costs of high ability individuals smaller than those of low ability individ-
uals. In other words, a prestigious degree can help to land a good job, but
not to hold on to it, so this leads to self-selection when signaling.
A natural extension of this model is to combine the signaling role of ed-
ucation with the human capital role of education (Becker 1964), to derive
more precise empirical implications about the complete e®ects of formal edu-
cation and on-the-job training and experience. There are other signs at work
besides employment relationships. For example, more able workers may be
assigned more complicated jobs, or jobs with higher responsibility. If job
hierarchies are visible to outside ¯rms, this can act as a sign of work produc-
tivity. This is precisely what Waldman (1984) proposes: job assignments as
a sign of productivity.20
Finally, the present framework considers noise as an example of two-
dimensional asymmetric information. This issue is already present in the
Akerlof (1970) lemons model: there is a problem with lemons because there
are some dishonest sellers who are willing to misstate the quality of their car.
It might be applied to consider the closely related issue of the in°uence of
character on productivity. Though some traits of character like perseverance
might also be captured by formal education (Weiss 1995), others will not.
20Waldman also makes the point that, with a continuum of types, job assignments will
only reveal part of this private information to the market, i.e., that those assigned to the
higher productivity job are above a certain ability level.
255 Appendix
5.1 Single-crossing in the NxN case
In the NxN case, if the log of µi and ºj, i;j = 1;2;:::;N are evenly spaced,
then













For the single-crossing condition under two-dimensional heterogeneity to
be satis¯ed in the NxN case when the log of types in each dimension are







It is necessary, because otherwise µN¡1vN > µNv1 and there is at least one
lower productivity type that is willing to go farther in terms of education than
a higher productivity type. It is su±cient, because due to our assumption
that the log of types is evenly spaced, µ2=µ1 = ::: = µN¡1=µN¡2 = µN=µN¡1,
which together with (22) implies that µ1vN · µ2v1, ..., µN¡2vN · µN¡1v1.
Inequality (22) boils down to condition (7) for single-crossing in Section 2
when N = 2.











For a given range of variation (vN=v1) in the second dimension, the single-
crossing condition becomes increasingly harder to satisfy as N grows. Con-
versely, as N grows without limit, the range of variation of º has to shrink
to zero for single-crossing to be satis¯ed.
265.2 Employment relationships as noisy signs in 3x3 case
Consider a 3x3 example, with three types of productivity µi and three types
of taste for study Àj, i;j = 1;2;3, where the types are evenly spaced apart
so µ2=µ1 = (µ3=µ1)1=2 and º2=º1 = (º3=º1)1=2.
Assume that v3=v1 > µ3=µ1, so v2=v1 > µ2=µ1 and v3=v2 > µ3=µ2. This
is only interesting scenario where there is a qualitative di®erence with the
2x2 case; otherwise, there is no educational signal for which workers of three
types of productivity can pool together.
Two orderings are possible, either v2=v1 > µ3=µ1, so ranking is basically
determined by º, i.e.,
(24) µ1º1 < µ2º1 < µ3º1 < µ1º2 < µ2º2 < µ3º2 < µ1º3 < µ2º3 < µ3º3;
or v2=v1 · µ3=µ1 so ranking is given by
(25) µ1º1 < µ2º1 < µ1º2 · µ3º1 < µ2º2 < µ1º3 · µ3º2 < µ2º3 < µ3º3:
We will analyze the second case, but the ¯rst case would be similar for
our purposes.
The distribution of types detailed in Table 4 will determine how the dif-
ferent types group.
<please insert Table 4. Probability distribution in 3x3 case>
Without entering into a full characterization of possible equilibria, let ei
denote education level, with ¯ve levels, e0 < e1 < e2 < e3 < e4, e0 = 0, where
each ei is associated to the following expected productivity:
(26) f
e = 0 ) E[µje = 0] = µ1
e = e1 ) E[µje = e1] =
p12µ1+p21µ2
p12+p21
e = e2 ) E[µje = e2] =
p13µ1+p22µ2+p31µ3
p13+p22+p31
e = e3 ) E[µje = e3] =
p23µ2+p32µ3
p23+p32
e = e4 ) E[µje = e3] = µ3
In a manner similar to Figure 4, one can de¯ne each successive ei, i =
1;2;3; as the least-cost signal such that no type has an incentive to deviate.
For this to be a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, expected productivity has to
27be strictly increasing in the signal. If not, either types grouped at e3 would
prefer to deviate to e2, or types grouped at e2 would prefer to deviate to
e1, or both. This would reduce the number of educational signals from ¯ve
to either four or three, producing even more bunching of types. Other than
this, the analysis would be similar to equilibrium (26).
In equilibrium (26), only the extreme type (µ3;º3) goes far enough to
single itself out with an educational signal. For all the types in between
types (µ3;º3) and (µ1;º1), there will be some bunching (in the extreme, they
will all pick the same signal), so it will not be possible to tell them perfectly
apart.
Take the case where wages are sticky (if wages were °exible, we already
know that employment relationships reveal no information at all). If the
partially pooling equilibrium in the ¯rst period were given by (26), Will
wages in the second period still be independent of education (as happened
in Section 3)?
In the second period the employer will have an incentive to dismiss work-
ers whose productivity is lower than their wage. This will perfectly reveal the
worker's exact productivity for intermediate educational level e2 (e4): those
dismissed have productivity µ1 (µ2), so those retained have productivity µ2
(µ3).
However, this sign does not work perfectly for educational level e3. The
expected productivity of workers with education e3 is either above or below
µ2. If (i) it is equal to, or less than, µ2, the employer will dismiss type
µ1 employees. This will reveal the type of dismissed workers, but not of
continuing workers, of whom the market only knows that their expected
productivity is





If the employer o®ers type µ3 less than (27), the uninformed ¯rms will
¯nd it pro¯table to attract the whole pool of continuing workers, o®ering an "
more (the analysis is similar to Figure 6). Hence, the employer will be willing
to pay type µ3 a wage equal to expected productivity of pool, namely (27),
and type µ2 a wage of µ2. Given these conditional wage o®ers of the informed
¯rm, the optimal response of uninformed ¯rms is to o®er µ2 to the pool; if
they o®er more, they will lose money. This result implies that employment
relationships will never allow the market to di®erentiate between type (µ3;º1)
28and type (µ2;º2), so earnings of type (µ3;º1) will depend on education in the
long run.
What would happen if the expected productivity of types that pick e3
were (ii) larger than µ2? In that case, type (µ2;º2) would be dismissed to-
gether with type (µ1;º3), so outside ¯rms would only be willing to pay pool
of dismissed workers their expected productivity. For total revelation of
productivity of the lower productivity types, one would need to add more
rounds.
In either case, employment relationships only lead to partial revelation
of the employer's private information. However, while (ii) has transitory
consequences, (i) has permanent consequences because adding more periods
would not change the state of a®airs. Hence, even if wages are sticky, with
three types of productivity dismissals no longer produce full revelation of
types. This relates to the Gibbons and Katz (1991) results for a continuum
of productivity levels.
To determine whether the ¯rst period equilibrium in a dynamic setup
will indeed be as speci¯ed in (26), one has to incorporate the long-term
value of education for more able workers in the ¯rst period signaling game.
If the problem of noise is strong enough, it will still be possible to ¯nd an
equilibrium for which there is bunching of workers with di®erent productivity
levels in the ¯rst period.
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31Table 1.Probability distribution in 2x2 case
Taste º
º1 º2
Ability µ µ1 p11 p12
µ2 p21 p22




- positive fp12µ1 + (p21 + p22)µ2g=(p12 + p21 + p22)
Employment relationship
- dismissed µ1
- renewed fp11µ1 + (p21 + p22)µ2g=(p11 + p21 + p22)




- positive (p12µ1 + p21w1;i + p22µ2)=(p12 + p21 + p22)
Ability
- low µ1
- high (p21w1;i + p22µ2)=(p21 + p22)
Table 4. Probability distribution in 3x3 case
Taste º
º1 º2 º3
µ1 p11 p12 p13
Ability µ µ2 p21 p22 p23














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 7: Wage policies with °exible wages
39